


# Protecting international premises and events from terrorism

A course book for the NEBOSH International Certificate in Protecting Premises and Events from Terrorism



Certificate



nebosh

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## 4.3 Effective internal and external communication planning

### 4.3.1 The importance of clear, timely and controlled communication during an incident

Organisations should put in place communication procedures to alert people to the danger and plan how they will communicate effectively during a terrorist threat. This should include internal and external communication for workers and anyone attending the premises or event. It is important that clear, accurate and timely information is provided to everyone on site about the protection measures should these be activated. Where applicable, workers should be trained to use public address systems. Signage or direct verbal instructions should inform people of what is happening and what actions they should take. Clear communication reduces panic and assists those who are unfamiliar with the premises or emergency procedures.

### 4.3.2 Inclusion of communication processes in training exercises and scenario exercises

Worker training should focus on ensuring everyone is aware of the protection procedures, including exit routes, dispersal procedures, lockdown procedures and emergency response. Training should include scenario-based exercises simulating different attack types and should cover how communication will occur during an incident, key roles and the responsibilities that all workers will have. All training should include any stakeholders from shared areas and neighbours, to ensure clear planning and information sharing.

### 4.3.3 External communication requirements

Organisations should also communicate externally, as required. This includes notifying the emergency services and neighbouring premises or tenants.

#### Notifying emergency services

Emergency services should be notified as soon as an incident is identified that poses a threat to life, health, property or the environment. The organisation's Emergency Response Plan (ERP) should include a clear procedure for when and how to notify emergency services. This includes details of the roles and responsibilities (who is responsible for calling the emergency services) and the contact information for all relevant emergency services (for example, police, fire, ambulance and poison control).

Depending on the jurisdiction, industry or workplace, there may be obligations to report certain types of incidents (such as fires, hazardous material spills or injuries). For example, there may be a requirement to report chemical spills to the relevant environmental authority.

## 4.4 Requirements for trauma first aid and worker competence

Organisations should recognise the important role of a first aider on site in the event of an incident. There may be a significant delay before emergency services arrive on site to treat injured people if the site or event is remote from any major hospitals or if there is a suspected layered attack, such as a secondary device targeting emergency workers.

### 4.4.1 Trauma equipment that may (subject to risk) be needed on site

The following trauma equipment should (subject to risk) be readily available on site:

- Catastrophic bleed control kits: these should include:
  - o Tourniquets
  - o Haemostatic dressings
  - o Pressure bandages
  - o Trauma shears
  - o Nitrile gloves
  - o Chest seals
  - o Emergency blankets
  - o A marker pen to record the time the tourniquet was applied.
- Public access trauma (PACT) kits: these are designed for use by untrained workers or the public. They should be clearly marked and wall-mounted (similar to automated external defibrillators). PACT kits should include simple instructions for emergency use.
- Automated external defibrillators (AEDs): these are vital in incidents involving cardiac arrest and should be accessible within a two to three-minute walk across the site. AEDs are specifically designed to be used by an untrained person and will talk the person through the necessary steps in the event of a sudden cardiac arrest.
- Trauma bags: for use by on-site security, first aiders or trained workers. Trauma bags include airway aids, oxygen (if trained to use), splints, bag-valve masks (BVMs) and advanced bleed control tools.

### 4.4.2 Strategic placement and availability of first-aid kits

All trauma equipment should be clearly signposted and easily accessible during an incident. Workers should be trained on their locations and use. This ensures trained personnel can access equipment quickly and co-ordinate a response. Kits should be strategically placed in the following areas:

- High-footfall areas where large numbers of people gather or move through. Optimal places are main entrances and exits, ticketing areas, lobbies, concourses and queuing zones.

- **Emergency egress and lockdown:** this includes:
  - o ensuring evacuation routes are clearly marked, well-lit and kept free of obstruction;
  - o training workers in directing people calmly during evacuations or lockdowns;
  - o providing invacuation areas where people can shelter if exiting is unsafe.
- **Accessibility and inclusion:** for example:
  - o ensuring control measures accommodate people with disabilities or additional needs;
  - o training workers to assist safely and respectfully during emergencies.

Effective movement control protects both safety and security, balancing accessibility with protection and enabling quick adaptation to emergency conditions.

### Measures in relation to the physical safety and security of the premises or the premises at which the event is to be held

The third type of protection measure relates to the physical safety and security of the premises or event. These measures focus on physical safety and security measures that help mitigate the impact of an attack or deter/hinder an attacker. Physical security measures create layers of defence that deter, delay and detect threats before they cause harm. Key physical safety and security measures include:

- **Perimeter security:** for example:
  - o using fencing, bollards, planters or vehicle security barriers to prevent access by a hostile vehicle;
  - o clearly defining boundaries and controlling all entry points;
  - o keeping perimeters well-lit and free of obstructions.
- **Access and screening controls:** this includes:
  - o installing secure doors, locks and gates, with appropriate access systems (such as keycards or codes);
  - o screening bags, deliveries and vehicles for prohibited or dangerous items;
  - o managing deliveries through designated access points away from public areas.
- **Building design and layout:** this could include:
  - o designing layouts to reduce hiding places and improve natural surveillance;



Figure 4: A row of bollards

Credit: K-FK/Shutterstock.com

## 5.2 Apply the Deter-Detect-Delay-Deny model to layered security

### 5.2.1 The Deter–Detect–Delay–Deny model and its application in protective security planning

Deter-Detect-Delay-Deny is a protective security model that is designed to lower the attractiveness of a potential target by making it clear that the premises or event has visible security measures, good surveillance to identify suspicious behaviour, strategies to delay or interrupt the progress of an attacker and finally means to prevent access.

#### **Deter: visible measures that discourage hostile intent**

Deter refers to the measures taken to discourage the selection of a premises or event as a potential target in the first place. The aim is to influence the decision-making process of a hostile individual or group before any attack planning or reconnaissance develops into direct action. By creating a visible, credible and professional security presence, potential attackers are made aware that their actions are likely to be noticed, challenged and disrupted, reducing both their confidence and the likelihood of success. Effective deterrence begins with visibility. Uniformed workers stationed at entrances, exits and key points act as a clear signal that the site is alert, controlled, and well-protected. Trained security personnel conducting regular patrols, supported by supervisors who actively engage with the public, reinforce a sense of vigilance.

The presence of police, security officers, stewards or site marshals in high-visibility clothing demonstrates organisational readiness and capability. Consistent and confident behaviour by workers, maintaining good situational awareness, using radios professionally and responding promptly to incidents, further strengthens this visible deterrent effect.

Environmental design and signage also play a critical role. Well-positioned CCTV cameras, with no obvious blind spots, provide both reassurance and surveillance. Clear signage indicating 'CCTV in Operation', 'Security Checks in Progress' or 'Restricted Access – Authorised Personnel Only' communicates that the environment is monitored and managed. Adequate lighting, particularly around entrances, car parks, service yards and approach routes, enhances both personal safety and visibility, making hostile reconnaissance or unauthorised access far more difficult to achieve without detection. These measures contribute to a layered perception of control, reinforcing that the site is prepared and alert.

Workers at all levels should be encouraged and empowered to challenge unusual behaviour confidently and courteously. Embedding these behaviours in the organisation's security culture is central to deterrence. Challenging suspicious